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Abstract
In [5], we proposed a general equilibrium model, with incomplete nancial mar-
kets and asymmetric information, where agents forecasted prices privately with-
out rational expectations. Consistently, they anticipated idiosyncratic sets of future
prices, and elected probability laws on these sets, that we called beliefs. Under mild
conditions, and di¤erently from Hart [1975] and Radner [1979], equilibrium always
existed in this model, as long as agentsanticipations precluded arbitrage. The joint
determination of equilibrium prices and beliefs is traditionally seen as a rational ex-
pectationsproblem. Hereafter, we suggest it may be otherwise. We propose to show
that agents, whose prior anticipation sets yield an arbitrage, may update their expec-
tations from observing trade opportunities on nancial markets. With no price to be
observed, they eventually infer smaller arbitrage-free anticipation sets, which can-
not be narrowed down any further. Once these sets are attained, equilibrium prices
may change if agents change their beliefs, but they will convey the same information.
Key words: anticipations, inferences, perfect foresight, existence problem, ratio-
nal expectations, nancial markets, asymmetric information, arbitrage.
JEL Classication: D52
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1 Introduction
The traditional approach to sequential nancial equilibrium relies on Radners
(1972-1979) classical, but restrictive, assumptions that agents have the so-called ra-
tional expectationsof private information signals, and perfect foresightof future
prices. These assumptions lead to well-known cases of inexistence of equilibrium,
which followed Hart (1975) and Radner (1979). The joint determination of prices
and beliefs is then explained by a price model from which agents may infer informa-
tion, that is, agents are assumed to know how equilibrium prices are determined.
In [5], we dropped rational expectations and let agents form their forecasts and
beliefs privately. The model we proposed led to opposite outcomes as the classical
one: information and beliefs were typically asymmetric at equilibrium, whose full
existence property could be restored, even in the cases of asymmetric information
and real asset markets, studied, respectively, by Radner (1979) and Hart (1975). In
our setting, agents, being unaware of other agentsforecasts (upon which equilib-
rium prices depend), need anticipate (idiosyncratic) sets of realizable prices in each
state they expect, and elect probability laws on these sets, which we call beliefs.
In [5], we referred to anticipation structuresas the collections of anticipation
sets across agents, whose intersections were non-empty, and to structure of be-
liefsas the collections of beliefs, whose supports dened an anticipation structure.
An arbitrage-free anticipation structure was one which granted no agent an un-
limited arbitrage opportunity on nancial markets. We also introduced a notion
of minimum uncertainty set, denoted by , which embedded the incompressible
uncertainty upon prices, stemming from private beliefs.
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In recalling the models results below, we implicitly assume that consumers are
cautious enough to let their anticipation sets include .
We showed in [5] that a sequential equilibrium existed (with prices clearing
all current and future markets) if, and only if, agentsanticipation structure was
arbitrage-free. When the anticipation structure was not arbitrage-free at the outset,
agents, endowed with no price model, could yet narrow down their anticipation sets
and infer an arbitrage-free anticipation structure, from observing a so called no-
arbitrage priceof assets. That inferred anticipation structure represented agents
ultimate information and could not be further rened, e.g., from observing subse-
quent equilibrium prices. In this sense, the joint determination of prices and beliefs
at equilibrium escaped the rational expectation paradigm, since agents never used
a price model. Yet, the appearance of a no-arbitrage price on markets remained un-
explained. The main purpose of this paper is to address this issue formally, before
possibly implementing the path to equilibrium into a strategic market game.
The no-arbitrage prices comprise all equilibrium asset prices. Yet, when the
anticipation structure is not arbitrage-free at the outset, agents cannot agree on
a price assessment of assets. We now propose to show that, in that case, agents
may always narrow down their anticipation sets from observing mutually benecial
trade opportunities on nancial markets. A trade-house might reveal these trades.
That renement process leads agents to infer the coarsest arbitrage-free anticipation
structure rening the initial structure. It extends to this innite dimensional set-
ting the renement path described in Cornet-De Boisde¤re (2009). Again, agents
rened anticipation sets, after being inferred without observing any price, cannot
be narrowed down any further, even from observing equilibrium prices. The latter
may change jointly with agentsbeliefs, but convey no additional information. In
2
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this sense, the joint determination of beliefs and prices at equilibrium drops rational
expectations. Indeed, agents use no price model in their path towards equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we summarize the specication
and properties of the model presented in [5]; in Section 3, we present the inference
path towards equilibrium anticipations when no market price is available.
2 The basic model
Hereafter, we consider a pure-exchange economy with two periods (t 2 f0; 1g),
a commodity market and a nancial market, where agents may be asymmetrically
informed and form private price forecasts. The sets of agents, I := f1; :::;mg, com-
modities, L := f1; :::; Lg, states of nature, S, and assets, J := f1; :::; Jg, are all nite.
Dropping proofs, we recall the main denitions, claims, and Theorem 1, of [5].
2.1 The models notations
Throughout, we denote by  the scalar product and k:k the Euclidean norm on
an Euclidean space and by B(K) the Borel sigma-algebra of a topological set, K.
We let s = 0 be the non-random state at t = 0 and S 0 := f0g[S. For all set   S 0
and tuple (s; l; x; x0; y; y0) 2 LRRRLRL, we shall denote by:
 xs 2 R, ys 2 RL the scalar and vector, indexed by s 2 , of x, y, respectively;
 yls the lth component of ys 2 RL;
 x 6 x0 and y 6 y0 (respectively, x << x0 and y << y0) the relations xs 6 x0s
and yls 6 y0ls (resp., xs < x0s and yls < y0ls ) for each (l; s) 2 f1; :::; Lg;
3
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 x < x0 (resp., y < y0) the joint relations x 6 x0, x 6= x0 (resp., y 6 y0, y 6= y0);
 RL+ = fx 2 RL : x > 0g and R+ := fx 2 R : x > 0g,
RL++ := fx 2 RL : x >> 0g and R++ := fx 2 R : x >> 0g;
 M0 := f(p0; q) 2 RL+RJ : kp0k+ kqk = 1g;
 Ms := f(s; p) 2 S  RL+ : kpk = 1g, for every s 2 S;
 M := [s2SMs, a topological subset of the Euclidean space RL+1;
 B(!; ") := f!02M: k!0 !k < "g, for every pair (!; ") 2M R++;
 P () := f!2M : (B(!; "))>0; 8">0g, the support of a probability, , on (M;B(M));
 (P ), for any closed set, P  M, the set of probabilities on (M;B(M)), whose
support (as dened above) is P .
2.2 The commodity and asset markets
Consumption goods may be exchanged by consumers, on the spot markets of
both periods. In each state, s 2 S, an expectation of a spot price, p 2 RL+, or the spot
price, p, in state s itself, are denoted by the pair !s := (s; p) 2 S  RL+. Since we are
only concerned about relative prices, spot prices at t = 1 are restricted to the setM.
Each agent, i 2 I, receives an endowment, ei := (eis) 2 RLS0+ , that is, a bundle
of commodities, ei0 2 RL+ at t = 0, and eis 2 RL+, in each state s 2 S, if this state
prevails at t = 1. To harmonize notations, for every triple (i; s; !) 2 I  S0 Ms, we
will also refer to ei! := eis. Ex post, the generic ith agents welfare is measured by a
continuous utility index, ui : R2L+ ! R+, over her consumptions at both dates.
The nancial market permits limited transfers across periods and states, via
J assets, or securities, j 2 J := f1; :::; Jg. Assets are exchanged at t = 0 and pay
4
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o¤ at t = 1, in any contingent state, in a xed amount of account units and/or
commodities. For any forecast ! 2M, the cash payo¤s, vj(!) 2 R, of all assets, j 2 J ,
conditional on the occurence of (state and) price !, dene a row, V (!) = (vj(!)) 2 RJ .
Agents can take unrestrained positions (positive, if purchased; negative, if sold),
in each security, which are the components of a portfolio, z 2 RJ . Given an asset
price, q 2 RJ , a portofolio, z 2 RJ , is thus a contract, which costs q z units of account
at t = 0, and promises to pay V (!)  z units tomorrow, for each expectation, ! 2 M,
if ! obtains. Similarly, we normalize rst period prices, !0 := (p0; q), to the set M0.
2.3 Information and beliefs
Ex ante, the generic agent, i 2 I, is endowed with a private idiosyncratic set of
anticipations, Pi  M, according to which she believes tomorrows true state and
price (i.e., which will prevail at t = 1) will fall into Pi. This set may be rened from
observing markets at t = 0. Consistently with [2], the set, Pi  SRL, encompasses
a private information signal that the true state will be in a subset Si of S (that is,
Pi  SiRL). Agents receive no wrong signal, hence, no state will prevail tomorrow,
out of the pooled information set, S := \iSi. This yields the following denitions.
Denition 1 A closed subset of (S  RL++) \M is called an anticipation set. Its ele-
ments are called anticipations, expectations or forecasts. We denote by A the set of
all anticipation sets. A collection (Pi) 2 Am is called an anticipation structure if:
(a) \mi=1Pi 6= ?.
We denote by AS the set of anticipation structures. A structure, (P 0i ) 2 AS, is said
to rene, or to be a renement of (Pi) 2 AS, and we denote it by (P 0i )  (Pi), if:
(b) P 0i  Pi; 8i 2 I.
5
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A renement, (P 0i ) 2 AS, of (Pi) 2 AS, is said to be self-attainable if:
(c) \mi=1P 0i = \mi=1Pi.
A belief is a probability, , on (M;B(M)), whose support is an anticipation set, i.e.,
P () 2 A (as denoted in sub-Section 2.1). A structure of beliefs is a collection of
beliefs, (i), whose supports dene an anticipation structure (i.e., (P (i)) 2 AS).
We denote by B and SB, respectively, the sets of beliefs and structures of beliefs.
A structure, (0i) 2 SB, is said to rene (i) 2 BS, which we denote (0i)  (i), if
(P (0i))  (P (i)). The renement, (0i), is self-attainable if \mi=1P (0i) = \mi=1P (i).
Remark 1 Along the above Denition, an anticipation set is a closed set of spot
prices (at t = 1), whose values are never zero. A belief is a probability distribution
on (M;B(M)), which cannot put a positive weight on arbitrarily low prices. Agents
anticipations or beliefs form a structure when they have some forecasts in common.
The set of common forecasts is left unchanged at a self-attainable renement.
2.4 Consumersbehavior and the notion of equilibrium
Agents make decisions at t = 0, after having (possibly) inferred from markets an
anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and having reached nal beliefs, (i) 2 i2I (Pi),
so that, (P (i)) = (Pi),2 hereafter set as given, and referred to. The generic ith
agents consumption set, X(i), is that of continuous mappings from f0g [ Pi to RL+:
X(i) := C (f0g [ P (i); RL+).
A consumption, x 2 X(i), relates s = 0 to a consumption decision, x0 := x!0 2 RL+,
at t = 0, and, continuously on P (i), every expectation, ! := (s; p) 2 P (i), to a
2 It is important to bear in mind (from Theorem 1 in [5]) that a change in equilibrium prices may result from
a change in agentsbeliefs, (i) 2 i2I (Pi), but cannot bring or withdraw information to any agent.
6
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consumption decision, x! 2 RL+, at t = 1, conditional on the occurence of state s, and
price p, ex post. Her preferences are represented by the V.N.M. utility function:
x 2 X(i) 7! Ui(i; x) :=
R
!2P (i) ui(x0; x!)di(!).
That ith agent elects an optimal strategy, (x; z)2X(i)RJ , in the budget set:
Bi(!0; i) := f(x; z) 2 X(i)RJ : p0(x0 ei0)6  qz and ps(x! ei!)6V (!)z; 8! := (s; ps) 2 P (i)g.
The above economy is denoted by E . It retains the standard small consumer
price-taker hypothesis, along which no single agents belief, or strategy, may alone
have a signicant impact on prices. It is said to be standard if, moreover, it meets
the following Conditions:
 Assumption A1: for each i 2 I; ei >> 0;
 Assumption A2: for each i 2 I, ui is continuous and strictly concave;
 Assumption A3: for any (i; l; t) 2 ILf0; 1g, the mapping (x0; x1) 7! @ui(x0; x1)=@xlt
is dened and continuous on f(x0; x1) 2 R2L+ : xlt > 0g, and (inf A @ui(x0; x1)=@xlt) > 0 ,
for every bounded subset A  f(x0; x1) 2 R2L+ : xlt > 0g.
The economys concept of equilibrium is dened as follows:
Denition 2 A collection of prices, !s 2 Ms, dened for each s 2 S0, beliefs, i 2 B,
and strategies, (xi; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i), for each i 2 I, is a sequential equilibrium of the
economy E, or correct foresight equilibrium (CFE), if the following Conditions hold:
(a) 8s 2 S, !s 2 \mi=1P (i);
(b) 8i 2 I; (xi; zi) 2 arg max(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) Ui(i; x);
(c) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1(xi!s ei!s) = 0;
(d)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0.
7
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Under the above conditions, the beliefs, i, for each i 2 I, or the prices, !s, for each
s 2 S0, are said to support the equilibrium.
2.5 No-arbitrage prices and the information they reveal
Recalling the notations of sub-Section 2.1, we rst dene no-arbitrage prices.
Denition 3 Let an anticipation set, P 2 A, and a price, q 2 RJ , be given. Price q is
said to be a no-arbitrage price of P , or P to be q-arbitrage-free, if:
(a) @z 2 RJ :  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0, 8! 2 P , with one strict inequality;
We denote by Q(P ) the set of no-arbitrage prices of P .
Let a structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and, for each i 2 I, the above price set, Q(Pi), be given.
We refer to Qc[(Pi)] := \mi=1Q(Pi) as the set of common no-arbitrage prices of (Pi). The
structure, (Pi), is said to be arbitrage-free (respectively, q-arbitrage-free) if Qc[(Pi)]
is non-empty (resp., if q 2 Qc[(Pi)]). We say that q is a no-arbitrage price of (Pi),
and denote it by q 2 Q[(Pi)], if there exists a renement, (P i ), of (Pi), such that
q 2 Qc[(P i )]. Moreover, if (P i ) is self-attainable, q 2 Qc[(P i )] is called self-attainable.
The above denitions and notations extend to any consistent beliefs, (i) 2 i2I (Pi),
as denoted in sub-Section 2.1. We then refer to Q(i) := Q(Pi), for each i 2 I, and to
Qc[(i)] := Qc[(Pi)] and Q[(i)] := Q[(Pi)] as, respectively, the sets of no-arbitrage prices
of i, and of common no-arbitrage prices, and no-arbitrage prices, of the beliefs (i).
We notice that the symmetric renement, (P i ), of any struture (Pi) 2 AS, that is,
(P i )  (Pi), such that P j = \mi=1Pi for every j 2 I, is self-attainable and arbitrage-free.
Moreover, any equilibrium price on assets markets is a no-arbitrage price.
No-arbitrage prices convey information, as recalled from [5] in Claim 1.
8
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Claim 1 Let a structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and no-arbitrage price, q 2 Q[(Pi)], be given.
Then, there exists a coarsest q-arbitrage free renement of (Pi), denoted by (Pi(q)),
in the sense that (Pi(q)) is q-arbitrage-free and every q-arbitrage-free renement of
(Pi) renes (Pi(q)). Moreover, if q 2 Q[(Pi)] is self-attainable, (Pi(q)) is self-attainable.
Proof see [5].
Denition 4 Given (Pi) 2 AS and q 2 Q[(Pi)], the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement
of (Pi) is said to be revealed by price q. A renement, (P 0i )  (Pi), is said to be price-
revealable if it is the coarsest q0-arbitrage-free renement of (Pi), for some price
q0 2 Q[(Pi)]. By extension, if q 2 Qc[(Pi)], we say that (Pi) is revealed by price q.
Given a structure, (Pi) 2 AS, a price, q 2 Q[(Pi)], and the renement (Pi(q))  (Pi),
of Claim 1, we recall the denition and property of two sequences of sets, fAni gn2N
and fPni gn2N, dened, for each i 2 I, by induction, as follows:
 for n = 1, we let A1i = ? and P 1i := Pi;
 for n 2 N arbitrary, with Ani and Pni dened at step n, we let An+1i := Pn+1i := ?,
if Pni = ?, and, otherwise,
An+1i := f! 2 Pni : 9z 2 RJ ;  q  z > 0; V (!)  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0; 8! 2 Pni g;
Pn+1i := P
n
i n An+1i , i.e., the agent rules out anticipations, granting an arbitrage.
Claim 2 Given (Pi) 2 AS and q 2 Q[(Pi)], the above sequences, fAni gn2N and fPni gn2N,
satisfy the following assertion: 9N 2 N : 8n > N;8i 2 I; Ani = ? and Pni = Pi(q).
Proof see [5].
9
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2.6 The existence Theorem
With private idiosyncratic beliefs, a nonempty set of minimum uncertainty exists,
any element of which can obtain as an equilibrium price for some beliefs today.
Denition 5 Let 
 be the set of sequential equilibria (CFE) of the economy, E. The
minimum uncertainty set, , is the subset of prices at t = 1, which support a CFE,
namely:  = f! = (s; p) 2M : s 2 S; 9((!s); (i); [(xi; zi)]) 2 
; ! = !sg.
The following Theorem states existence properties of a standard economy.
Theorem 1 A standard economy, E, its minimum uncertainty set, , and an an-
ticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, such that   \mi=1Pi meet the following Assertions:
(i)  6= ?;
(ii) 9" > 0 : 8(s; p) 2 , 8l 2 L, pl > ";
(iii) a structure of beliefs, (i) 2 mi=1 (Pi) (along sub-Section 2.1s notations), sup-
ports a CFE if, and only if, (Pi) is arbitrage-free.
Proof see [5].
The set  may be seen to embed the incompressible uncertainty stemming from
the fact that agentsbeliefs are private. It is the set of equilibrium prices for some
unknown structure of beliefs today. Along Claim 2 and Theorem 1, whenever agents
are cautious enough to embed that set into their anticipation structure, (Pi), and
observe a self-attainable no-arbitrage price (which always exists), q 2 RJ , they may
rene their information with no price model, and reach the equilibrium anticipation
structure, (Pi(q)). They cannot infer more information than (Pi(q)). Whence reached,
agents may well change their beliefs, with an e¤ect on the equilibrium price, that
equilibrium price will convey exactly the same information, namely, (Pi(q)).
10
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Yet, the question arises how a no-arbitrage price may obtain when (Pi) is not
arbitrage-free at the outset, since agents can never agree on any assessment of assets
with their in intial information, (Pi). The next Section addresses this issue.
3 A renement path to equilibrium
3.1 Characterizing the no-arbitrage condition
We rst characterize common no-arbitrage prices and structures.
Claim 3 Let (Pi) 2 AS , (i) 2 i2I(Pi), (using sub-Section 2.1s notations) and
q 2 RJ be given. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) q 2 Qc[(Pi)];
(ii) for every i 2 I, there exists a mapping, f : Pi ! R++ in the Riesz space L2( i)
such that q =
R
!2Pi V (!)f(!)di(!);
Moreover, (Pi) is arbitrage-free if and only if it meets the following AFAO Condition:
There is no portfolio collection (zi) 2 (RJ)I, such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i)  zi > 0
for every pair (i; !i) 2 I  Pi, with at least one strict inequality.
Proof Let (Pi) 2 AS and q 2 RJ be given.
(ii)) (i) Assume that assertion (ii) holds and let i 2 I be given and f : Pi ! R++
be such that q =
R
!2Pi V (!)f(!)di(!). Let z 2 RJ be such that  q z > 0 and V (!)z > 0
for every ! 2 Pi. Assume, rst, that V (!)  z > 0, for some ! 2 Pi. Then, the above
inequalities V (!)  z > 0, which hold for every ! 2 Pi, and the continuity of V at
! imply q  z = R
!2Pi V (!)  zf(!)di(!) > 0, in contradiction with the above relation
 q z > 0. Hence, V (!)z = 0, for all ! 2 Pi and qz = 0, and assertion (i) holds. 
11
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(i) ) (ii) Assume that Assertion (i) holds and let i 2 I and P 0i := fs = 0g [ Pi be
given and L2(P 0i ;R) be the set of mappings from P 0i to R, whose restriction to Pi is
in the Riesz space L2(i), endowed with the duality (f; g) 2 L2(P 0i ;R)2 7! < f; g > :=
f(0)g(0) +
R
!2Pi f(!)g(!)di(!), norm f 2 L2(P 0i ;R) 7! kfk :=
q
f(0)2 +
R
!2Pi f(!)
2di(!)
and metric topology. Thus, L2(P 0i ;R) is a convex metric space, with linear sub-spaces:
A := ff 2 L2(P 0i ;R) : 9z 2 RJ ; f(0) =  q  z and f(!) = V (!)  z; 8! 2 Pig;
A? := ff 2 L2(P 0i ;R) : < a; f > = 0; 8a 2 Ag.
Let L2(P 0i ;R+) and L2(P 0i ;R++) be, respectively, the subsets of non-negative and
strictly positive valued mappings of L2(P 0i ;R). Assertion (i) is written A\ L2(P 0i ;R+) =
f0g. Assume, by contraposition, that A? \ L2(P 0i ;R++) = ?, i.e., assertion (ii) fails
(which implies that ! 2 Pi 7! V (!) is nonzero).
From assertion (i) and above, the nonempty cone L2(P 0i ;R++)   A? is not dense.
Hence, from ([1], Lemmas 5.44, p.188, and 5.74, p. 203) there exists a nonzero
linear functional, ', which separates A? and L2(P 0i ;R++), such that:
'(a) = 0 6 '(b), for every (a; b) 2 A?  L2(P 0i ;R++).
From Riesz Theorem (see [1], p. 440), there exists f 2 L2(P 0i ;R), such that
'(h) = < f; h >, for every h 2 L2(P 0i ;R). The linear space A is closed, hence, with
obvious denition, A?? = A (see [1], p. 215). Then, from the above inequalities, the
relations f 2 A?? \ L2(P 0i ;R+)nf0g = A \ L2(P 0i ;R+)nf0g hold and contradict the above
formulation, A\ L2(P 0i ;R+) = f0g, of assertion (i). 
The fact that (Pi) meets the AFAO Condition if arbitrage-free is proved in [5]. 
Assume, now, that (Pi) meets the AFAO Condition. For each i 2 I, we dene
L2(P
0
i ;R) as above and let L := i2IL2(P 0i ;R) be endowed with the operator, metric
12
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and topology of product spaces. We let L+ and L++ be the subsets of non-negative
and strictly positive valued functions of L and A, A? be the linear sub-spaces:
A := f(fi) 2 L : (fi(0)) = 0; 9(zi) 2 RJI :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0; fi(!i) = V (!i)zi; 8(i; !i) 2 IPig;
A? := ff 2 L : < a; f > = 0;8a 2 Ag.
The AFAO Condition is written: A \ L+ = f0g. If A?\ L++ = ?, the very same
arguments as above apply, and, as we let the reader check, yield a contradiction.
Hence, we may set as given (fi) 2 A?\ L++ 6= ?. Then, by taking (zi) 2 (RJ)I , such
that (zi; zj) = ( z1; 0), for every (i; j) 2 I2, i 6= 1, j =2 f1; ig, the relation (fi) 2 A? yields:R
!2Pi fi(!)V (!)  zdi(!) =
R
!2P1 f1(!)V (!)  zd1(!), for every pair (i; z) 2 I  RJ . Let
q :=
R
!2P1 f1(!)V (!)d1(!). From above, q =
R
!2Pi fi(!)V (!)di(!), for every i 2 I, and,
from assertion (ii) and above, (Pi) is arbitrage-free. The proof is now complete. 
3.2 The coarsest arbitrage-free renement
We show any anticipation structure admits a coarsest arbitrage-free renement.
Claim 4 Any anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, admits a unique coarsest arbitrage-
free renement, namely, a renement, (P i )  (Pi), such that:
(i) (P i ) is arbitrage-free;
(ii) every arbitrage-free renement of (Pi) is a renement of (P i ).
That coarsest arbitrage-free renement, henceforth denoted (Pi), is self-attainable.
Proof Let (Pi) 2 AS be given and R(Pi) be the set of arbitrage-free renements
of (Pi). That set contains the symmetric self-attainable renement of (Pi). Let
P i = [(P 0i )2R(Pi)P 0i , for every i 2 I. By construction, (P i )  (Pi) is self-attainable
and satises assertion (ii) of Claim 4. Assume, by contraposition, that (P i ) is not
13
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arbitrage-free, that is, from Claim 3-(iii), there exists a portfolio collection (zi) 2
(RJ)I , such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i)  zi > 0 for every couple (i; !i) 2 I  P i , with
at least one strict inequality, say, for i = 1 and ! 2 P 1 . From the continuity of
! 7! V (!), and the denition of (P i ), there exists (P 0i ) 2 R(Pi) and !1 2 P 01, close
enough to !, such that,
Pm
i=1 zi = 0, V (!i)  zi > 0 for every couple (i; !i) 2 I  P 0i and
V (!1)  z1 > 0, which (from Claim 3) contradicts the fact that (P 0i ) is arbitrage-free.
This contradiction proves assertion (i), and completes the proof of Claim 4. 
We notice that the coarsest arbitrage-free renement of any structure (Pi) 2 AS
is price-revelable along Dention 4 above and coincides with (Pi) if, and only if, (Pi)
is arbitrage-free.
We now examine how agents, starting from initial anticipations, (Pi) 2 AS, and
endowed with no price model a la Radner, may still update their beliefs (when (Pi)
is not arbitrage-free) and reach the above renement (Pi) from observing markets.
3.3 Sequential renement through trade
Throughout, a structure, (Pi) 2 AS, is given and assumed not to be arbitrage-
free. Therefore, agents cannot agree on a price assessment of assets, given this
information. We study how they may narrow down in steps their expectation sets
from observing exchange opportunities on nancial markets. A trade-house may
help reveal these exchanges, e.g., by seeking prots. We thus dene, by induction
on n 2 N, two sequences, f(Ani )gn2N and f(Pni )gn2N, of sub-sets of (f?g [M)m:
 we let A0i = ? and P 0i := Pi, for each i 2 I;
 with Ani and Pni dened at step n 2 N, for each i 2 I, we let, for each i0 2 I:
14
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An+1i0 := f! 2 Pni0 : 9(zi) 2 (RJ)m;
Pm
i=1 zi=0; V (!)zi0>0; V (!i)zi>0; 8(i; !i) 2 IPni g
Pn+1i0 := P
n
i0 n An+1i0
In the above renement steps, agents rule out expectations, granting an arbi-
trage, because they may eventually trust the market over their incomplete informa-
tion and realize that what they initially thought to be an arbitrage was ctitious.
Claim 5 Let (Pi) 2 AS be given and (Pi) be its coarsest arbitrage-free renement.
Let f(An)gn2N and f(Pni )gn2N, be dened from above. The following assertions hold:
(i) 9N 2 N : 8n > N;8i 2 I; Ani = ? and Pni = PNi ;
(ii) (PN ) = (Pi), along assertion (i).
Proof Let (Pi) 2 AS be given, f(Ani )gn2N and f(Pni )gn2N be dened as above and
let P i := \n2NPni = limn!1 & Pni , for each i 2 I.
We show, rst, by induction on n 2 N, that (Pi)  (Pni )  (Pi) for every n 2 N.
The relation holds from the denition for n = 0, since (P 0i ) := (Pi). Assume that
(Pi)  (Pni )  (Pi) holds for a given integer, n 2 N. Then, for each i 2 I, Pni is
closed, and so is Pn+1i from the denition and the continuity of ! 7! V (!). Assume,
by contraposition, that, for some n 2 N, and some i 2 I, say i = 1, P1  Pn1 and
P1 * Pn+11 . Then, there exist ! 2 P1 \ An+11 and (zi) 2 (RJ)m, such that
Pm
i0=1 zi = 0,
V (!)  z1 > 0 and V (!i)  zi > 0, for every (i; !i) 2 I  Pi  I  Pni , which contradicts
Claims 3 and 4, along which (Pi) is arbitrage-free and meets the AFAO Condition.
Hence, the relations (Pi)  (Pni )  (Pi) hold for all n 2 N, which implies, passing
to the limits on nonempty intersections of compact sets: (Pi)  (P i )  (Pi).
For each i 2 I, let Zoni := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 Pni g. Since f(Pni )gn2N is
non-increasing, the sequence of vector spaces, fi2IZoni g, is non-decreasing in (RJ)m,
15
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hence, stationary. We let N 2 N be such that i2IZoni = i2IZoNi , for every n > N .
Assume, by contraposition, that assertion (i) of Claim 5 fails, that is:
8n 2 N;9(!nin ; (zni ))2PninRJm :
Pm
i=1 z
n
i =0; V (!
n
in
)znin > 0 and V (!i)zni > 0;8(i; !i)2IPni .
From the denition of (Pni ) and (P
n+1
i ), the above portfolios satisfy, for all n 2 N,
(zni ) =2 i2IZoni and (zni ) 2 i2IZo(n+1)i , which is impossible, from above, if n > N .
This contradiction proves that assertion (i) of Claim 5 holds, for the integer N 2 N
introduced above. Moreover, (P i ) = (PNi ), is q-arbitrage-free (since A
N+1
i = ?, for
each i 2 I), which yields, from Claim 4 and above: (P i )  (Pi)  (P i )  (Pi). That is,
(Pi) = (P

i ) = (P
N
i ), and assertion (ii) of Claim 5 holds. This completes the proof. 
Thus, agents may always rene their information with no price model (and even
no market price to observe) and reach an arbitrage-free anticipation structure, and
an equilibrium along Theorem 1, if they are cautious enough to embed the set 
into their anticipations. We suggested in [5] the inference of  or of a bigger set
might result from past price observation.
Once agents have reached the coarsest arbitrage-free renement, (Pi), from ob-
serving trade opportunities, they have no means of changing their anticipations. All
equilibrium prices, which belong to Qc[(Pi)], reveal the coarse structure, (Pi). Along
Theorem 1, beliefs may well change and lead equilibrium prices to change, this will
not modify any agents anticipation set. In that sense, the path to equilibrium dis-
cards rational expectations.
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